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The COVID-19 pandemic highlights the pressing need to address common challenges faced 
by all countries and, in particular, provide special support to developing countries through 
international cooperation. Taxation, in particular Value Added Tax (VAT), is a key area for 
strengthening international cooperation because of its critical role in financing the COVID-19 
crisis and supporting global recovery. This article proposes the adoption of VAT treaties 
based on two considerations. First, there exist, in the interplay between states’ VAT laws, 
over-taxation and under-taxation that can be more effectively addressed by treaties than by 
unilateral state actions. Second, unlike income tax treaties, the VAT treaties would distribute 
more benefits from cooperation to developing countries than to developed countries, leading 
to normatively attractive distributional consequences. The proposed model offers a new 
approach to taxing cross-border transactions under VAT and could form part of the 
coordinated responses to a sustainable post-pandemic recovery.  
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION  
The outbreak of COVID-19 has resulted in simultaneous public health, social and economic 
crises in almost all countries. As governments around the globe navigate through the crises, 
tax policy has been used as a critical instrument in immediate government responses to 
provide support to households and keep businesses afloat.1 It is unquestionable that the tax 
system will play an important role in paying off the soaring national debts, financing 
Sustainable Development Goals and fostering global recovery in the aftermath of COVID-19 
once containment of the health crisis is in sight. Whilst the pandemic presents a global 
challenge, international tax cooperation needs to be strengthened more than ever to develop 
effective and coordinated responses and address the intensified revenue needs faced by all 
countries, in particular developing countries that have been disproportionately affected by the 
pandemic and yet have a much lower tax-to-GDP ratio.2  
 
For over a century, international tax cooperation has primarily been achieved in the field of 
income tax through a network of bilateral treaties that resolve double taxation and non-
 
1 See e.g., R. Krever, ‘Tax Responses to a Pandemic: An Australian Case Study’ 1 Belt and Road Initiative Tax 
Journal (2020) 52.  
2 The average tax-to-GDP ratio in developing countries included in the OECD Revenue Statistics database is 
almost half of the OECD average. See, OECD, ‘Domestic Revenue Mobilisation: A New Database on Tax 
Levels and Structures in 80 Countries’ (2018).  
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taxation resulting from overlapping and conflicting jurisdictional claims. The extensive 
income tax treaty network now consists of over 3,000 bilateral treaties. In another key area of 
fiscal law, Value Added Tax (VAT), however, international agreements are nearly absent. 
This raises an important question that has rarely been asked: should cooperation by way of 
treaties be pursued in VAT?3  
 
As the main general consumption tax in about 170 countries,4 VAT is a key source of 
revenue for Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries 
and has even greater significance in terms of revenue yields in middle and low income 
countries. Despite the geographical and revenue significance of the tax, almost all countries 
face significant challenges in taxing cross-border transactions in the digital economy, where 
over-taxation and under-taxation might arise in the absence of international coordinated 
actions. Addressing the common challenges in this area through international cooperation 
will become more pressing in a post-pandemic world. While traditional trade suffers massive 
disruptions to business and supply chains due to the unprecedented restrictions on the 
physical movement of goods and people, the pandemic has accelerated the shift to digital 
trade and e-commerce. The ongoing disruptions to the global economy call for rapid actions 
by international organisations and governments to support businesses to operate globally in a 
digital world. International VAT rules must be developed, in conjunction with policy in other 
fields, to meet the demands of the new digitalised trade environment.   
 
This article argues the case for the adoption of VAT treaties based on a common model, 
drawing on the experience of bilateral income tax treaties, as part of coordinated actions to 
aid global recovery. The case for VAT treaties is built on two main considerations. The first 
is the need for cooperation. There exist, in the interplay between states’ VAT laws, over-
taxation and under-taxation that can be more effectively addressed by treaties than by 
unilateral state actions. The article also examines how the current income tax treaties would 
provide an attractive role model for designers of VAT treaties to follow. The jurisdictional 
issues in income tax and VAT have both similarities and differences. Where there is a match 
between the underlying problems, the income tax model can be directly applied to solve the 
VAT problems. Where the underlying problems differ, the article shows how income tax 
treaty measures could provide sufficient remedies to the different VAT problems.  
 
The need for cooperation alone is not sufficient to justify the desirability of treaties because 
cooperation inevitably comes with costs. The second factor considered in this article is that 
international cooperation by way of VAT treaties would produce distributionally desirable 
consequences, delivering more benefits to developing countries than to developed countries. 
The desirability of income tax treaties has been called into question because of their unfair 
distributional consequences, with the benefits of cooperation flowing from developing to 
developed countries. The desirable distributional consequences of the proposed VAT treaty 
provide a further compelling case for the adoption of VAT treaties. In particular, the 
desirable distributional consequences secured in the VAT treaties would to some extent 
temper the unfair distribution in the income tax treaties and therefore improve the overall 
fairness of international tax cooperation.  
 
 
3 The question was posed in N. P. Eriksen, ‘Should Tax Treaties Play a Role for Consumption Taxes?’ 33 
Intertax (2005) 166. Ecker proposed a VAT model treaty in T Ecker, A VAT/GST Model Convention (IBFD 
2013). This model, however, may not be achievable for the reason explained in the text at note 56. 
4 The US is the only developed country that does not have a VAT.  
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The article suggests that in the case that treaty provisions are not distributionally neutral, 
bilateral treaties can be more easily achieved than a multilateral treaty. A common model 
treaty needs to be developed to reduce transaction costs involved in bilateral negotiations. 
The VAT treaties would therefore take the form of bilateral treaties based on a common 
model. They could be incorporated into the existing bilateral income tax treaties to increase 
the bargaining potential of developing countries.  
 
The proposed model offers a new approach to taxing cross-border transactions under VAT 
and can be used by policymakers as a basis for developing a collective and coordinated 
response to post-pandemic recovery. Closing the VAT gap in the context of cross-border 
transactions would not only secure additional revenue needed to cover the costs of COVID-
19 and support economic resilience in the short term, but also contribute to long-term tax 
capacity building in all countries involved. The model would also ease over-taxation and 
reduce tax obstacles to international trade to stimulate cross-border activities in times of 
economic downturn. In addition to addressing the common challenges faced by individual 
countries, the desirable distributional consequences of the model would help narrowing the 
global inequality exposed and exacerbated by the pandemic.  
 
2. VAT 
a) A neutral tax on international trade  
Developed independently in the 1920s by an American academic and German industrialist, 
the idea of a VAT lay dormant until resurrected in continental Europe a few years after the 
end of World War II in the post-war reconstruction period when the many European 
economies were faltering. At the time, an important source of revenue for almost all Western 
European countries, apart from the UK, was a “turnover” tax imposed on business sales. The 
UK applied a “purchase tax”, first enacted during World War II.5 Because the turnover taxes 
applied to all sales, the burden compounded along business supply chains, yielding two 
significant economic harms. First, the compounding tax encouraged vertical integration by 
businesses, leading to large and very often inefficient conglomerates as businesses tried to fill 
every need internally. Second, the compounding tax had a significant negative impact on the 
price of sales abroad, making exports uncompetitive.   
 
France was the first European country to attempt a solution to the cascading and cross-border 
sale problems with the adoption in 1948 of a limited “credit” mechanism for a narrow 
turnover tax. Businesses eligible for the relief continued to pay turnover tax on all sales but 
were able to recover some “input tax” included in the cost of acquisitions. The input tax 
credit system was extended to the general turnover tax regime in 1954 to establish what 
became the predecessor to the VAT system. 
 
The distortion of the turnover taxes with respect to cross-border sales was considered a 
serious obstacle to the completion of the internal market in the European Economic 
Community (EEC), as the European grouping was known at the time, which requires that 
supplies made locally and imported from another member state are taxed on the same basis. It 
was in this environment that the EEC Commission, exercising authority granted under the 
 
5 For details of the purchase tax, see The Exchequer, Report of the Committee on Turnover Taxation (Cmnd 
2300, 1964). 
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Treaty of Rome creating the EEC,6 established a Fiscal and Financial Committee charged 
with developing recommendations for a Community-wide solution to the inefficiency of the 
turnover taxes levied by member states and removing any tax constraints on cross-border 
sales within the Community. Chaired by German economist Fritz Neumark, the Committee 
issued a report in 1962 that subsequently became known as the Neumark Report, explaining 
how a comprehensive VAT could address both problems.7   
 
The proposed tax would remove the cascading taxation of turnover taxes by rebating, through 
a credit mechanism, all turnover tax included in the price of acquisitions by registered 
businesses. A fundamental principle of VAT is that it is a tax on final consumption, with the 
tax burden falling on final consumers only. In cross-border sales, this is achieved by applying 
the destination principle: the tax would operate as a “destination basis” tax that “zero rate” 
exports, meaning no tax would be imposed on exported goods or services and exporters 
would recover all tax on inputs, leaving the export free of taxation in the country of origin; 
Imports would be subject to tax in the same manner as locally produced supplies, yielding 
complete neutrality between imports and local production.  
 
Soon after the release of the Neumark Report, the EEC Council issued two Directives in 1967 
mandating the adoption of VAT systems in all member states and setting out the common 
rules on the place of taxation for cross-border supplies.8 As a result, all member states had 
VATs in place but the details of the taxes varied significantly. Genuine harmonisation was 
only achieved a decade later in 1977 with the adoption of the Sixth Directive on VAT.9  
 
The VAT was initially adopted in the EU as the mandatory form of general sales tax because 
of its advantage in achieving equal treatment of domestic and imported goods with precision 
through the destination principle. The EU VAT experience was considered an enormous 
success by other countries, and consequently, VAT quickly spread around the world in the 
1980s and 1990s. VAT is now a key type of consumption tax in about 170 countries. Most 
VAT jurisdictions outside the EU more or less followed the EU model in designing the tax. 
The world’s VAT systems are thus broadly similar compared to income tax, an outcome to a 
large extent attributed to the harmonisation of VAT in the EU.10 The destination principle has 
become an international norm and is applied in cross-border transactions in almost all VAT 
jurisdictions. 
 
b)  Jurisdictional overlaps or conflicts  
When VAT applies to international cross-border transactions involving suppliers in one 
jurisdiction and customers in another, jurisdictional overlaps or conflicts may arise in terms 
of legislative jurisdiction (the power to make the laws) and enforcement jurisdiction (the 
 
6 Art. 99, Treaty establishing the European Economic Community. 
7 EEC Commissioner, Report of the Fiscal and Financial Committee on Tax Harmonization in the Common 
Market (Neumark Report), Report 21, Doc. SD-32, EEC Commission, 1962; unofficial English translation by 
Dr. H. Thurston was published by the International Bureau and Fiscal Documentation in 1963 under the title 
“The EEC Reports on Tax Harmonisation: The Report of The Fiscal and Financial Committee and The Reports 
of The Sub-Groups A, B and C”. 
8 First Council Directive 67/227/EEC of 11 April 1967 on the harmonisation of legislation of Member States 
concerning turnover taxes; and Second Council Directive 67/228/EEC of 11 April 1967 on the harmonisation of 
legislation of Member States concerning turnover taxes- Structure and procedures for application of the 
common system of value added tax. 
9 Sixth Council Directive 77/388/EEC of 17 May 1977 on the harmonization of the laws of the Member States 
relating to turnover taxes- Common system of value added tax: uniform basis of assessment. 
10 V Thuronyi, K Brooks and B Kolozs, Comparative Tax Law (2nd edn, Kluwer Law International 2016), 281.  
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power to enforce compliance with legal commands), leading to either over-taxation or under-
taxation. A fundamental principle of VAT is that the tax should apply to all types of supplies 
and it should apply only once so that it is neutral in its application to all consumption. Both 
over- and under-taxation create economic distortions by favouring some supplies over others.  
 
OVERLAPPING LEGISLATIVE JURISDICTIONS  
Overlapping legislative jurisdictions may arise in two circumstances. First, although the 
destination principle assigns tax jurisdiction only to the country where consumption takes 
place, consistent application of the principle across countries requires common understanding 
of the place of consumption. The place of consumption of tangibles is normally determined 
on the basis of the location of goods, which can be easily identified with effective border 
controls. The determination of the place of consumption of intangibles is less straightforward 
because intangibles do not move across borders and cannot be physically tracked.11 It is 
probable that both the supplier’s and the customer’s jurisdictions agree that only one 
jurisdiction, namely the jurisdiction in which the final consumption takes place, has 
legislative jurisdiction to tax but hold different views on the place of consumption.12 When 
this happens, the final transaction might be subject to tax in both countries if they both regard 
themselves as the place of consumption.13  
 
The provision of entertainment services via the internet provides an example of a supply that 
raises overlapping jurisdiction issues; the place of consumption may be considered to be 
where the provider carries on his business, where the customer is located, or where the 
services are physically performed under VAT laws in different countries.14 The same service 
could be subject to tax claims by three states if the business provider, the actual services 
performers and the customers were all located in different jurisdictions that have different 
views on the place of consumption.15   
 
A further conflict of legislative jurisdictions may arise as a result of the indirect nature of 
VAT and the gaps between domestic rules that have no extraterritorial application in the 
circumstances where foreign registered businesses incur business expenses in a country. VAT 
operates as an “indirect tax” in the sense that the persons who have the legal obligation to 
remit the tax are different from those who bear the economic burden of the tax. Although 
VAT is a tax on final consumption, the tax is collected piecemeal from business suppliers 
along the supply and distribution chain that are expected to pass on the tax burden to the final 
consumers, rather than from the final consumers directly. The operational mechanism of most 
VAT systems requires that all taxes borne by the buyer in a business-to-business acquisition 
 
11 M Keen and W Hellerstein, ‘Interjurisdictional Issues in the Design of a VAT’ 63 Tax Law Review (2010) 
359.  
12 W Hellerstein, ‘Jurisdiction to Tax Income and Consumption in the New Economy: A Theoretical and 
Comparative Perspective’ 38 Georgia Law Review (2003) 1.  
13 Omitted from the analysis here is a theoretically possible, but in practice much rarer possibility, namely 
double non-taxation that arises when neither of the two countries consider themselves as the place of 
consumption. An example is that international transport of passengers from Australia to New Zealand is zero-
rated under both New Zealand and Australian VAT (known as Goods and Services Tax in these countries) Acts.  
14 Hypothetical examples of conflict in cross-border VAT rules can be found in R Millar, ‘Cross-Border 
Services – A Survey of the Issues’ in R Krever and D White (eds), GST in Retrospect and Prospect (Thomson 
Brookers 2007).  
15 The possibility was canvassed in Staatssecretaris van Financiën v L W Geelen (Case C-568/17) (8 May 
2019) where a Dutch adult services provider used Philippine personnel to provide services to clients in the 
Netherlands. The CJEU considered the state where the provider carried on his business (the Netherlands) was 
the place of supply and had the jurisdiction to tax.  
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should be removed by providing the buyer with a credit to offset the tax paid on acquisitions 
to be used in the business. This will not be possible if the vendor’s country does not accept 
credit claims by foreign registered enterprises and the buyer’s country does not provide 
credits for VAT paid to foreign suppliers, which is the current state of play in most countries. 
This type of conflict and the resulting over-taxation are considered a significant barrier to 
international trade and investment by businesses frequently incurring expenses in other 
countries.16 
 
TERRITORIAL CONSTRAINTS ON ENFORCEMENT JURISDICTION  
Even though legislative jurisdiction is entirely territorial, there may be circumstances where 
extraterritorial enforcement is necessary for the law to be effective. Cross-border supplies by 
foreign businesses to domestic consumers give rise to enforcement issues easily avoided in a 
fully domestic transaction. Although the tax is intended to operate as a tax borne by final 
consumers, it is the supplier only that is required to register and remit the tax. The system 
works well so long as the supplier is present in the state and easily susceptible to the state’s 
enforcement mechanisms.   
 
The operational model proved problematic in the case of foreign suppliers out of reach of 
local tax officials, however. Under international law, enforcement of a state’s fiscal laws 
within another state’s geographical borders is only allowed with the latter’s consent.17 To 
overcome the lack of enforcement jurisdiction over foreign suppliers, VAT systems have 
variously experimented with alternative enforcement regimes. Initially, most VAT systems 
responded to the challenges by shifting responsibility for remitting VAT from the supplier to 
the customer. In the case of intangible supplies, this was done through what became known 
as a “reverse charge” rule that required the customer to file a VAT return and declare the tax 
due on imports. A parallel response was adopted for importation of tangible goods by 
customers which were often stopped at post offices or courier depots until the intended 
customers paid VAT due.   
 
The reverse charge system used for imports of intangible supplies worked well when the 
customer was a local registered enterprise subject to full audit procedures but proved 
problematic when extended to final consumers in the internet age.18 Likewise, the tax before 
final delivery system used for imports of tangible products fared better prior to the internet 
age but proved wholly unsustainable with the enormous growth of online orders from foreign 
suppliers either directly or via retail platforms that overwhelmed the enforcement capacity of 
modern tax administrations. To cope with the influx of imports ordered online, most 
jurisdictions adopted exemptions from VAT for low value imported goods and digital 
supplies, a response that recognised the limitations of revenue authorities’ administrative 
capacity.19 However, under-taxation of these imports prompted complaints by local retailers 
of similar goods or services that are subject to full taxation and gives rise to significant 
 
16 OECD, ‘VAT/GST Relief for Foreign Businesses: The State of Play – A Business and Government Survey’ 
(February 2010), available at https://www.oecd.org/tax/consumption/44560750.pdf.  
17 F Mann, ‘The Doctrine of Jurisdiction in International Law’ Hague Recueil (1964-I), 139.  
18 The reverse charge approach is used for inter-provincial imports by final consumers in the Quebec Sales Tax 
system in Canada. See, R Bird and P-P Gendron, ‘Dual VATs and Cross-Border Trade: Two Problems, One 
Solution?’ 5 International Tax and Public Finance (1998) 429.  
19 An example is the Low Value Consignment Relief in the EU that exempted from VAT imports of goods 
valued at €22 or less before 1 January 2021.  
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revenue loss.20 Collection of VAT on imports of digital supplies and low value goods by final 
consumers remains an outstanding enforcement difficulty that needs to be resolved urgently, 
with COVID-19 further shifting the tax base from the traditional bricks-and-mortar economy 
to the digital economy. 
 
c) Why are there no VAT treaties?  
The proliferation of income tax treaties matched by the almost universal adoption of VAT 
across the globe raises an obvious question – why has the global community not witnessed an 
equal growth of VAT treaties? Previously, VAT treaties were considered unnecessary 
because the relative uniformity of VAT systems and the single destination principle 
underlying allocation rules largely reduced the possibilities for jurisdictional conflicts.21 This 
view no longer holds valid when globalisation, deregulation and digital transformation posed 
challenges to the application of VAT to cross-border sales that require remedies.22 Two larger 
geo-political factors and the growing use of self-help responses to the collisions of legislative 
and enforcement jurisdictions help explain the dearth of VAT treaties.  
 
RESOLUTION OF VAT WITHIN THE EU BY TREATY  
In income tax, much of the momentum for the take-up in tax treaties can be traced to the 
OECD’s initiatives and follow up treaty activities by its members. A majority of its members 
are also members of the EU, whose predecessor body is largely responsible for the growth of 
VAT. The overlap of membership in the EU and the OECD helps explain why there has been 
no impetus for a majority of OECD members to push for treaty solutions as there was for 
income tax.  
 
To the extent that income tax treaties are perceived as a means of achieving greater 
harmonisation of diverse national income tax systems,23 the EU VAT Directive governing the 
most important substance of all EU VAT laws acts as a quasi-multilateral “VAT treaty”, 
harmonising 28 national VAT systems (before the UK’s exit from the EU). The principal 
directive24 achieves uniform place of taxation rules across the member states and 
supplementary and complementary directives25 provide comprehensive solutions to the 
collection of VAT on cross-border sales and the refund of VAT on expenditures incurred by 
businesses registered in another state.  
 
Although member states were in theory part of a single economic community, until 1993 
border controls remained between states, enabling both exporting and importing countries to 
track the movement of goods. It was, consequently, not difficult to refund input tax in the 
exporting country and assess tax in the importing country in the case of intra-Community 
sales of goods. With the abolition of fiscal borders, new mechanisms were needed to ensure 
 
20 Commission, ‘Modernising VAT for E-Commerce: Question and Answer’ MEMO/16/3746; Productivity 
Commission, Australian Government, Collection Models for GST on Low Value Imported Goods: Productivity 
Commission Inquiry Report (Commonwealth of Australia 2017).  
21 BJ Arnold, J Sasseville and E Zolt, ‘Summary of the Proceedings of an Invitational Seminar on Tax Treaties 
in the 21st Century’ 50 Canadian Tax Journal (2002) 65.  
22 OECD, ‘The Application of Consumption Taxes to the Trade in International Services and Intangibles’ 
(2004).  
23 Arnold, Sasseville and Zolt, (n 21) 69.  
24 Council Directive 2006/112/EC of 28 November 2006 on the common system of value added tax. 
25 E.g., Council Directive 2008/9/EC of 12 February 2008 laying down detailed rules for the refund of VAT, 
provided for in Directive 2006/112/EC, to taxable persons not established in the Member State of refund but 
established in another Member State.   
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VAT was levied on a destination basis and exporters were able to recover all input tax. A 
variety of systems evolved over the following two and a half decades to accommodate 
changes in the European economy, most recently the rise of sales over internet platforms and 
the provision of digital services. The current rules provide separate regimes for business-to-
business supplies, where the supplier and customer are registered for VAT in an EU country, 
and business-to-consumer supplies, where only the supplier is registered. As a response to the 
challenges of the digital economy, a clearing house system established for a limited number 
of business-to-consumer digital supplies is expected to be expanded to eventually include all 
types of services and business-to-consumer sales of goods.26 Known as the “one stop shop” 
system, the rules enable businesses to remit VAT on cross-border sales in the countries where 
they are registered and deal only with their local tax administration which will then work 
through the clearing house to allocate taxes to the consumers’ jurisdictions.  
 
All the issues bilateral VAT treaties could address have been dealt with through the 
multilateral law and administrative agreements covering all EU member states. The VAT 
Directive eliminated jurisdictional conflicts for most cross-border trade by 23 of the 37 
members of the OECD, an outcome with profound implications for the adoption of VAT 
treaties outside Europe.  
 
NO VAT IN THE UNITED STATES (US)  
An important prompt for the global expansion of income tax treaty network was the shift in 
policy by the US, by far the world’s most powerful economy, to move away from unilateral 
measures and negotiate bilateral treaties.27 As the world’s only developed country without a 
VAT, the US suffered no similar jurisdictional conflicts with respect to this type of tax. 
Subordinate states levy retail sales tax, the main alternative of a VAT, but the federal 
government has neither constitutional authority nor political interest in negotiating with 
foreign governments on issues arising from possible overlaps or lacunae between state sales 
taxes and foreign VAT systems.  
 
The absence of a national VAT in the US does not mean there should be disinterest in that 
country in collisions of legislative jurisdictions created by differing views on the place of 
consumption and questions of enforcement jurisdiction posed by the growth of digital 
platforms and supplies. To the extent unilateral responses of VAT nations impact on US 
consumers importing from abroad or US businesses exporting their goods or services, the US 
federal government has a stake in solutions to cross-border VAT issues. That concern is 
clearly blunted, however, by the absence of any direct interest in VAT jurisdictional issues. 
As a result, the primary promotor of treaties as the optimal response to collisions of tax 
sovereignty claims in income tax plays no similar role in respect of VAT treaties. The shift to 
observer status only by the globe’s most important economy undoubtedly delayed 
significantly the process of countries turning to treaties to solve cross-border VAT issues.  
 
UNILATERAL SOLUTIONS  
In the absence of international agreements, states have resorted to unilateral responses to 
jurisdictional conflicts. Meanwhile, the OECD has been playing its leadership role in 
 
26 European Commission, Proposal for a Council Implementation Regulation amending Implementing 
Regulation (EU) No 282/2011 as regards supplies of goods or services facilitated by electronic interfaces and 
the special schemes for taxable persons supplying services to non-taxable persons, making distance sales of 
goods and certain domestic supplies of goods, COM(2018) 821 final.  
27 S Picciotto, International Business Taxation (2013), 39.  
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developing an internationally agreed framework of principles in the form of soft law 
guidance, with a view to facilitating consistent and coherent application of domestic rules to 
cross-border transactions.28  
 
About 30 countries (most of which are OECD members) adopted unilateral relief of VAT 
incurred by foreign businesses on input purchases.29 However, in the countries where 
unilateral relief exists, the systems in place are largely inconsistent in terms of the mechanism 
used, the scope of VAT recovery and restrictions to refunds. Two main mechanisms are 
found to provide refunds to non-resident businesses. The first is a direct refund mechanism. 
Some countries provide direct refunds to non-resident businesses for VAT charged on 
business expenses incurred in their territories. The second is a registration system used in 
countries where registration procedures are in place to allow foreign businesses that do not 
make taxable supplies in their territories to register and claim back input VAT.  
 
Both mechanisms have weaknesses. Registration systems impose higher compliance burdens 
as non-resident businesses are required to register for VAT and fill periodic returns.30 These 
costs may defer non-resident businesses from seeking a refund. Direct refund systems may be 
more susceptible to fraudulent refund claims because there is no easy way for the country in 
which expenditures were incurred to confirm the registration status of a business in another 
country.31 In addition, although countries provide relief through domestic laws on a unilateral 
basis, those using a direct refund mechanism tend to make the refunds conditional upon the 
grant of reciprocal refund rights by claimants’ countries to their resident businesses. 
However, because reciprocity is addressed through domestic laws rather than mutual 
agreement, a registration system may not be recognised by countries using a direct refund 
scheme as providing similar benefits to their resident businesses.32 
 
Some states, in particular developed countries, adopted unilateral measures to collect VAT on 
digital services and goods imported by domestic consumers, in both cases placing the 
responsibility for collecting the tax on foreign suppliers.33 The rules normally require foreign 
suppliers to register and pay VAT on supplies made to domestic consumers. The unilateral 
rules do not overcome the territorial limitations of enforcement jurisdiction of the state that 
has the jurisdiction to tax. Compliance with the rules by foreign businesses is voluntary 
because the customer’s jurisdiction cannot audit, or sanction in the case of non-compliance, 
suppliers do not have a physical presence in the territory.34 The rules have proved effective in 
respect of high-profile suppliers that take up a considerable market share for reputation 
reasons but have had little impact on small non-resident suppliers.35 A further reason for non-
compliance by small suppliers is that the costs for complying with different sets of tax rules 
 
28 A Charlet and S Buydens, ‘The OECD International VAT/GST Guidelines: Past and Future Developments’ 1 
World Journal of VAT/GST Law (2012) 175.  
29 OECD, (n 22) 7.  
30 P Dunne, GST: Business-to-Business Neutrality Across Borders – A Government Discussion Document about 
GST on Cross-Border Supplies between Businesses (Policy Advice Division of Inland Revenue 2011)  
31 Ibid.  
32 E.g., a number of EU countries, including Italy and Spain, do not recognise that Australia provides refund 
entitlements to their registered businesses via a registration system.  
33 E.g., the EU, South Africa, Korea, Japan, New Zealand and Australia introduced domestic rules to collect 
VAT on supplies of digital services by foreign suppliers. Australia, New Zealand and the EU extended the rules 
to cover low value goods supplied by foreign businesses.  
34 Addressing the Tax Challenges of the Digital Economy, Action 1 – 2015 Final Report, OECD/ G20 Base 
Erosion and Profit Shifting Project (OECD 2015). 
35 Ibid, 122.  
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are very high, in particular if they have customers in many countries and have to keep up 
with changes in tax law in different countries and file foreign tax returns in foreign 
languages. The Australian government, for example, acknowledged that the unilateral 
measure ‘has limitations and carries significant uncertainty about levels of compliance’.36 It 
nevertheless considered the approach to be the ‘best available collection model’ for adoption 
at the current stage.37  
 
While unilateral measures have achieved some success as stop-gap measures, they fall well 
short of effective long-term solutions to the enforcement difficulties. Responses to legislative 
jurisdictional overlaps have not gone any further from general principles and soft law 
guidelines developed by the OECD. Nevertheless, the OECD is aware that guidelines and a 
common understanding of principles are not sufficient in resolving jurisdictional conflicts, 
given that countries inevitably interpret concepts differently, and a dispute resolution 
mechanism would be necessary.38 International cooperation by way of treaties appears to be a 
rational solution to the VAT jurisdictional problems. 
 
Importantly, the reasons that explain the absence of VAT treaties do not undermine the 
necessity and desirability of such treaties. The absence of VAT treaties so far may be a result 
that VAT is a relatively new tax compared to income tax. The shift to a modern broad-based 
taxation on income was a key element in the transition from warfare states to modern welfare 
states in the early twentieth century in the industrialised world.39 The global spread of income 
tax preceded that of VAT by over 50 years. The regional and unilateral solutions may have 
retarded the adoption of VAT treaties, but the necessity of international cooperation will soon 
be learnt by individual states struggling with the challenges created by the rapid growth of the 
digital economy.  
 
The path to cooperation might be accelerated by two recent events that have a dramatic 
impact on the global economy. The first is the outbreak of COVID-19 that is fundamentally 
changing the structure of the economy towards a more digitalised economy. The second is the 
UK’s exit from the EU. Post-Brexit, the UK can no longer benefit from the EU solutions to 
VAT cross-border issues. Businesses are already seeing the disruptions caused by Brexit to 
UK-EU trade. Because of the new UK rules requiring EU businesses making supplies to UK 
customers to register for VAT in the UK,40 many EU exporters, in particular small 
businesses, ceased to supply to UK customers to avoid the complexities of UK VAT 
registration.41 Brexit offers a striking example of the impact of trade barriers created by the 
unilateral measure introduced by the UK, following the collapse of cooperation with EU 
countries. Nevertheless, the double shocks of Brexit and COVID-19 provide the UK with an 
opportunity to seek cooperation with the EU by way of treaty that may have wider 
international implications.  
 
 
36 Productivity Commission, Australian Government (n 20) 10.  
37 Productivity Commission, Australian Government, (n 20) 4 and 26.  
38 The need for model-based VAT treaties was recognised in OECD, ‘The Application of Consumption Taxes to 
the Trade in International Services and Intangibles’ (2004).  
39 S. Picciotto, ‘Fragmented States and International Rules of Law’ (1997) 6 Social & Legal Studies 259.  
40 HMRC, ‘Changes to VAT Treatment of Overseas Goods Sold to Customers from 1 January 2021’ ( 3 
December 2020), available at https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/changes-to-vat-treatment-of-
overseas-goods-sold-to-customers-from-1-january-2021/changes-to-vat-treatment-of-overseas-goods-sold-to-
customers-from-1-january-2021. 
41 R. Plummer, ‘EU Firms Refuse UK Deliveries Over Brexit Tax Changes’ (BBC News, 4 January 2021), 
available at https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-55530721.  
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3. ARE INCOME TAX TREATIES A GOOD MODEL FOR A VAT TREATY?  
In income tax, treaties have a long history of being used to resolve jurisdictional overlaps and 
conflicts. The well-established income tax treaty network is considered a solid basis for the 
adoption of VAT treaties.42 A key question is whether income tax treaties are a good model 
for a VAT treaty. This depends on the extent to which the jurisdictional problems in income 
tax and VAT are similar so that the income tax model can be directly applied to a VAT treaty 
and, where the underlying problems differ, whether the income tax model offers a solution to 
the VAT problems.   
 
a) Overlapping legislative jurisdictions  
In an international setting, countries claim jurisdiction to tax income on the basis of two 
universally recognised and widely applied principles: the source principle and the residence 
principle. Under the source principle, a country applies the tax to income arising within its 
geographical borders. The principal ground advanced for source taxation is that resident and 
non-resident investors who benefit equally from the government should contribute equally to 
the cost of government. Generally, income tax laws require residents to contribute to national 
revenue by way of a tax imposed on their ability-to-pay measured by reference to their total 
worldwide income, without regard to its source. The two principles form the legitimate basis 
of a state’s jurisdiction to tax income, deriving from different views on equity among 
individual taxpayers.43 Most countries’ income tax is structured on the basis of a combination 
of the two principles and, as a consequence, residents are taxed on their worldwide income 
and non-residents are taxed on their domestic-sourced income.  
 
Jurisdiction to tax based on both principles is entirely consistent with the territorial notion of 
sovereignty under international law, with the existence of a valid nexus (persons or the source 
of the income) within the territory.44 Concurrent application of the principles that establish 
sufficient connection between the state exercising the tax jurisdiction and the taxpayer or 
taxable income can still produce extensive jurisdictional overlaps, which may arise in three 
circumstances. First, income earned by a resident of one jurisdiction from a source in another 
is subject to two competing tax claims (one country claims tax jurisdiction on the basis of 
source, while the other claims tax jurisdiction on the basis of residence). Second, two 
countries claim the same income is sourced in their territory (two countries claim tax 
jurisdiction on the basis of source). Third, two countries consider a person is resident in their 
territory (two countries claim tax jurisdiction on the basis of residence).   
 
Without a deliberate relief system, overlapping jurisdictional claims will inevitably result in 
double taxation of the same income, placing businesses investing abroad at a competitive 
disadvantage. The double taxation problem has long been considered a barrier to international 
trade and investment. 
 
The first type of jurisdictional overlap was the primary cause of double taxation that needed 
remedies. There are two possible responses to the problem – unilaterally forging sovereign 
taxing rights, or negotiating a split of tax jurisdiction between states with competing tax 
claims through cooperation. The initial response was negotiation of bilateral international 
 
42 Eriksen (n 3), 169. 
43 N. H. Kaufman, ‘Fairness and the Taxation of International Income’ (1998) 29 Law & Policy in International 
Business 145. 
44 Picciotto, (n 27) 308.  
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agreements between neighbouring countries with close economic and political ties.45 The first 
income tax treaties comprise six treaties initiated by German federal states within the German 
Empire and one by the Empire itself in the period 1899 to 1912.46 Under domestic pressure 
from the business community, a few countries turned to unilateral responses, as an alternative 
to the slow process of bilateral negotiations, to overlapping tax claims. To promote outbound 
investment that was considered important for post-war economic recovery, the US in 1918 
effectively opted to cede its taxing rights over residents where income derived by residents 
was subject to source country taxation abroad, by providing full credit against US tax liability 
for any taxes paid by US investors in a source country.47 Under the unilateral system, the 
source jurisdiction has the primary right to tax the income, whereas the residence country is 
left with only a residual taxing right where its tax rate is higher than that in the source 
country.  
 
The spread of income tax systems and the liberalisation of trade and investment following 
World War I prompted broader international recognition of the double tax problem and only 
months after it was formed, the League of Nations was asked by the International Chamber of 
Commerce to develop a treaty-based solution to overlapping tax claims.48 Although the early 
ambition was to develop a comprehensive multilateral treaty,49 the League of Nations quickly 
realised that a multilateral agreement was not possible due to the great diversity of income 
tax systems and disagreement between countries over the division of tax jurisdiction. The 
result was the publication of several model treaties from the 1920s to 1940s for bilateral 
negotiations.  
 
The treaties distinguished between different types of income and divided tax jurisdiction 
between two countries with tax claims based on source (source country) and residence 
(residence country) by applying one of three rules to each type of income, either restricting 
the source country’s tax jurisdiction by setting a maximum tax rate on the particular type of 
income, providing the residence country with exclusive tax jurisdiction, or providing the 
source country with primary tax jurisdiction to leave the residence country with residual 
taxing space only.  
 
The treaty models published between the 1920s and 1940s form the basis for the model treaty 
published by the OECD in 1963 and most recently updated in 2017,50 which became the most 
influential model and is used as the basis for negotiations of almost all bilateral income tax 
treaties.  
 
While income tax treaties divide tax jurisdiction on the basis of source and residence, the 
definition of source and residence is a matter left to domestic laws. In a treaty, countries 
agree not to exercise fully their sovereign rights to apply worldwide income taxation of 
residents and source taxation of non-residents. Treaties restrain countries from applying 
 
45 See S Jogarajan, ‘Prelude to the International Tax Treaty Network: 1815-1914 Early Tax Treaties and the 
Conditions for Action’ (2011) 31 OJLS 679.  
46 P Schmidt, ‘The Emergence of Denmark’s Tax Treaty Network— A Historical View’ [2018] (1) Nordic Tax 
Journal 49, 50. 
47 R Avi-Yonah, ‘Who Invested the Single Tax Principle? : An Essay on the History of U.S. Treaty Policy’ 
(2014-15) 59 New York Law School Law Review 309, 313. 
48 K Vogel, ‘Double Tax Treaties and Their Interpretation’ (1986) 4(1) International Tax and Business Lawyer 
4, 10-11. 
49 ‘Report of the Committee on International Double Taxation’ (1946) Proceedings of the Section of 
International and Comparative Law 40. 
50 OECD, Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital (2017).  
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domestic rules, without changing those rules in any way. This is justified by the need to 
preserve national fiscal sovereignty by interfering least with national tax rules. However, as 
noted, jurisdictional overlap will arise when two countries claim to be the source country of 
the same income or when a taxpayer is considered a resident of two countries based on 
domestic rules.  
 
Traditionally treaties solved the “dual residency” conflicts with a “tie-breaker” rule, making 
the person only a resident of one of the two countries for the purposes of the treaty.51 Treaties 
contain no provision to directly address the problem of overlapping source claims but do 
provide a dispute resolution mechanism through a “mutual agreement procedure” between 
“competent authorities”, the treaty term for divisions of national revenue agencies 
responsible for international tax conflicts.52   
 
Prior to 2008 the OECD model contained no mechanism for resolving disputes where the two 
competent authorities were unable to reach agreement under a mutual agreement procedure, 
exposing taxpayers to the risk of double taxation. In one often-cited case, US authorities 
assessed the income derived by a German orchestra conductor as labour income with a source 
in the US while German authorities viewed the payments he received as royalty income 
sourced in Germany. 53 The income was subject to full double taxation as both countries saw 
the income as sourced in their respective jurisdiction and the competent authorities were 
unable to reach an agreement under the mutual agreement procedure.54 The OECD model 
now provides for mandatory arbitration where authorities cannot reach agreements. 
 
The legislative jurisdiction problems in  VAT are not equivalent to those in income tax.55 In 
VAT, conflicts do not arise as a result of competing sovereign claims based on different 
principles because only one principle, the destination principle, determines the allocation of 
tax jurisdiction. The main type of jurisdictional overlap in  income tax that promoted the 
adoption of income tax treaties does not arise in VAT. Nevertheless, the income tax treaty 
solution to this type of conflicts has significant distributional implications for adoption of 
VAT treaties, as will be discussed later in Section 4.  
 
The legislative jurisdiction conflicts in VAT mirror the other two types of conflicts in income 
tax. In income tax, both countries agree on the allocation of tax jurisdiction based on source 
and residence but have different views on the source of an income or the residence of a 
person. In VAT, states agree that tax jurisdiction is allocated to the country of consumption 
but have different rules to determine the place of consumption. The income tax treaty 
experience suggests that cooperation by way of treaty is possible only if treaties interfere 
with domestic rules in the least possible manner. The only treaty that harmonised place of 
taxation rules in VAT is the Treaty of Rome that authorises the Council to issue directives 
with which domestic laws must conform. Therefore, a common set of place of taxation rules 
arguably cannot be achieved by a treaty unless states agree to transfer part of their 
sovereignty to a transnational body, as is the case with the EU.56  
 
51 Ibid, Article 4. 
52 OECD, (n 50), Article 25. It is worth noting that direct taxpayer participation is limited in the mutual 
agreement procedure that aims to resolve disputes between the contracting states.   
53 Boulez v. Commissioner, 83 T.C. 584 (1984).  
54 E. Farah, ‘Mandatory Arbitration of International Tax Disputes: A Solution in Search of a Problem’ (2009) 9 
Florida Tax Review 703.  
55 G Cooper and R Vann, ‘Implementing the Goods and Services Tax’ 21 Sydney Law Review (1999) 337, note 
257.  
56 Ecker proposed a VAT model treaty that harmonises domestic place of taxation rules in Ecker, (n 3).   
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However, it is not impossible to overcome the problems of incompatible concepts or 
definitions in national laws by way of treaty. The dispute resolution procedure in income tax 
treaties to be used when an individual or a company is defined to be a resident of the state in 
the national laws of two treaty partners is an example of how treaties can resolve conflicts of 
this sort. The income tax treaty provision is built on an understanding that both countries 
have different definitions of residency and requires both to reconsider their domestic 
definition in light of higher level indicators. A similar approach could be used to resolve 
conflicts over the place of consumption. A VAT treaty would set out the place of 
consumption as the principle for allocating jurisdiction between treaty partners, an approach 
already adopted by most countries in their domestic laws, and fallback to dispute resolution 
procedures in cases of conflicts and inconsistencies.  
 
b) Territorial Constraints on Enforcement Jurisdiction  
While globalisation facilitates the growth of multinational enterprises and the mobility of 
capital, it also increases the chances for international tax avoidance and evasion, creating 
significant challenges for national tax administrations. In income tax, two enforcement issues 
arise from the mutual recognition of the other state’s jurisdiction to tax income based on 
source and residence and the territorial constraints on enforcement jurisdiction: collection of 
information necessary to levy the tax and collection of tax debts in the other state’s territory.  
 
INFORMATION EXCHANGE  
To exercise its enforcement jurisdiction over residents, a state must have information about 
those taxpayers’ domestic and foreign source income. Using tax procedure rules enacted 
pursuant to a state’s legislative jurisdiction over resident entities and institutions, revenue 
authorities can collect information on taxpayers’ income derived from domestic financial 
institutions, companies, trusts, employers, and so on. But the legislative and consequent 
enforcement jurisdictions apply only as far as the state’s borders and without cooperation 
from source country authorities, it is difficult for a state to collect information about income 
derived by residents from foreign payers.  
 
One jurisdiction, the US, has acted unilaterally to require a select group of income providers, 
foreign banks, to provide information on all US account holders but to date no other country 
has attempted unilateral action and the US has limited its information provision to 
information on foreign bank accounts.57 Critics of the law have claimed it is an 
unprecedented exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction.58 Enforcement is wholly domestic, 
however, based on a 30 percent withholding of US source income paid to financial 
institutions that do not comply with reporting requirements, and in this way it could be 
argued the reporting system is a voluntary programme with implied consent by any foreign 
financial institution that wishes to derive income from the US. Nevertheless, given the 
importance of US transactions to foreign banks, the rule has de facto global application. It is 
unlikely any other jurisdiction would be in a position to enforce unilateral rules of this sort.   
 
57 [US] Internal Revenue Code § 1471- 1474, inserted by Hiring Incentives to Restore Employment Act 2010. 
The measures are commonly referred to as the Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act (FATCA), though 
technically this Act never existed, with the provisions of the original bill having been incorporated into other 
legislation.  
58 S. D. Michel and H. D. Rosenbloom, ‘FATCA and Foreign Bank Accounts: Has the U.S. Overreached?’ 
(2011) Tax Analysts 709; R. Seer, ‘Overview of Legislation Practices Regarding Exchange of Information 
between National Tax Administrations in Tax Matters’ (European Parliament, 2015).  
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The unique nature of the US unilateral enforcement rule limited to income derived through 
foreign bank accounts reveals the difficulty faced by residence countries seeking to 
unilaterally obtain the information necessary for imposing tax on the worldwide income of 
residents. Income tax treaties offer solutions to the enforcement difficulty by providing for 
information exchange between states by mutual agreement.59 
 
The information exchange procedure can be used to address the inefficiency of one of the 
unilateral approaches to the legislative conflict in VAT that might arise when businesses 
incur costs in foreign jurisdictions. The direct refund system can be easily implemented in a 
treaty where both countries agree to treat the foreign tax (the tax ultimately collected by the 
country of consumption) as domestic tax and refund the tax on business acquisitions. A treaty 
could therefore provide double tax relief while overcoming the problem of inconsistent 
recognition of reciprocal treatment under the unilateral approaches. However, the 
implementation of the direct refund system in a treaty would only be effective if information 
exchange provision were in place, under which the business customer’s country confirms the 
customer’s registration status to minimise opportunities for fraudulent refund claims in the 
other country.  
 
ASSISTANCE IN THE COLLECTION OF TAXES  
A second aspect of enforcement jurisdiction in income tax is the collection of taxes once 
information has been collected, legislative jurisdiction exercised, and an assessment issued 
against the taxpayer. Taxes imposed on non-residents deriving local source income can be 
collected by way of withholding tax obligations imposed on the local persons paying the 
income. Collection of tax from residents is also relatively straightforward in most cases; 
inherent in the concept of residency is presence in the jurisdiction. There are instances, 
however, when taxation of residents is problematic, particularly if the resident departs for 
another jurisdiction with all his or her assets. The jurisdiction in which the person was 
resident can continue the assessment process and likely obtain a judgment debt against the 
defaulting taxpayer but a foreign court will not entertain an action to have a taxation debt 
enforced, even where they would normally recognise judgment debts from another 
jurisdiction on the basis of general comity principles.60   
 
Foreign jurisdiction assistance with the collection of taxes is only possible if the foreign 
jurisdiction is required by binding legal agreements to provide the assistance. Since 2003, the 
OECD model treaty has included provision for mutual obligation of signatories to assist with 
the collection of each other’s tax debts. Although provision of mutual assistance by treaty 
overcomes the formal international law constraints, not all jurisdictions agree to inclusion of 
the measure in their treaties due to practical obstacles. For example, the great disparities with 
respect to substantive and procedural laws between countries may undermine the trust needed 
between the states to allow for enforcement measures based on another state’s internal laws.61 
However, while the mutual assistance provision in the OECD model is relatively new, it is 
 
59 OECD, (n 50), Article 26.  
60 The rule of non-enforcement of foreign tax claims, known as the “revenue rule”, is a well-established 
common law doctrine deriving from the UK. See L Robertson Jr, ‘Extraterritorial Enforcement of Tax 
Obligations’ (1966) 7(2) Arizona Law Review 219. 
61 P Baker and others, ‘International Assistance in the Collection of Taxes’ (2011) Bulletin for International 
Taxation 281.  
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expected that it will gain importance as requests for recovery assistance grow with the 
increased mobility of persons and capital.62 
 
The enforcement difficulties concerning the collection of taxes differ in income tax and VAT. 
In income tax, neither the source nor residence country have significant difficulty with the 
collection of taxes. Mutual assistance in the collection of taxes is only provided on request 
after the requesting state conducts an audit and assesses the tax debts against a taxpayer. In 
contrast, the main enforcement difficulty in VAT is the collection of taxes from cross-border 
business-to-customer sales. A solution to the VAT problem could be an extension of the 
scope of mutual assistance in collection in income tax to cover ordinary VAT liabilities in 
cross-border sales. In fact, the EU has adopted this approach to address the problem partially 
internally, which can be used as the basis for developing VAT treaties.  
 
A VAT treaty would mirror the one-stop-shop arrangements currently in place in the EU for 
certain intra-Community supplies of electronic services. The treaty would place the 
obligation of collecting VAT on business-to-consumer sales of digital supplies and low value 
goods on the exporting country. The VAT would be collected at the rate applicable in the 
customer’s jurisdiction by the exporting country as if it were its own tax. The exporting 
country would then transfer the revenue to the importing country via a clearing house 
mechanism. The revenue inflows and outflows would be netted against each other and only 
the net balance is transferred between each pair of countries. This arrangement is entirely 
consistent with the destination principle. The treaty therefore does not change the allocation 
of taxing rights between countries in any way. Apart from addressing the enforcement 
difficulty in importing countries, the treaty arrangement has the advantage of reducing the 
compliance costs for exporters, by removing the requirement for them to register and file tax 
returns in every country where they have customers, that would otherwise arise under the 
unilateral measures. This would reduce the tax barriers to cross-border trade, in particular for 
small businesses, created by the unilateral measures.  
 
The proposed model requires closer cooperation in terms of mutual assistance than in the 
income tax treaties. The income tax provision aims to establish a mechanism for states to 
lend assistance in recovering unpaid taxes in other states upon requests. The proposed VAT 
treaty would make it automatically obligatory for states to collect the current tax applied to 
certain supplies by other countries. The practical difficulties encountered in income tax 
should be less significant in VAT, because the structure and principles of the VAT systems 
around the globe are much more similar. An obstacle to the proposed cooperative regime 
could be that countries, in particular developed countries equipped with strong tax 
administrations, may be reluctant to rely on foreign tax administrations for collection of their 
own taxes due to the disparities in administrative capacities. However, current unilateral 
measures that rely on foreign business suppliers for collection of VAT could be far less 
effective than collection by even weak tax administrations.  
 
Any progress that could be made within the EU on its one-stop-shop mechanism would 
contribute to the political acceptance of the proposed treaty model, given that 27 member 
states would have already agreed on the treaty terms and would negotiate with non-EU 
countries as a single bloc. The EU has recognised the necessity of seeking international 
administrative cooperation in ensuring the effectiveness of its VAT laws. In 2018, it signed 
an agreement with Norway to strengthen administrative cooperation in preventing VAT fraud 
 
62 Ibid, 287.  
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and assisting each other in the recovery of VAT claims.63 As part of its action plan to support 
the COVID recovery strategy, the European Commission will propose negotiations of 
administrative cooperation agreements, similar to the agreement with Norway, with other 
main EU trade partners.64 The EU initiatives clearly show the political willingness to enhance 
international VAT cooperation and will open the door to further cooperation in the form of 
the treaty model outlined in this article. 
 
4. DISTRIBUTIONAL CONSEQUENCES 
Like in many other areas of cooperation, although it is in the interest of all countries to 
cooperate, the benefits of international tax cooperation are more often than not distributed 
unevenly between states. With the pandemic highlighting the necessity and urgency of 
providing assistance to developing countries through international cooperation, the 
distributional consequences should be an important consideration in determining the 
desirability of cooperation in the post-COVID era. In addition, the distributional 
consequences to a large extent determine whether treaties take the form of bilateralism or 
multilateralism. The income tax treaty experience offers important lessons for VAT treaties 
as regards distributional consequences.  
 
a) Income Tax Treaties  
The distributional consequences of income tax treaties primarily derive from the functions 
the treaties perform in resolving one type of legislative jurisdictional overlap. In this respect, 
income tax treaties present two distinct but intertwined features. First, the main function of 
income tax treaties is to directly regulate the distribution of legislative jurisdiction. In other 
areas of economic regulation, treaties may affect states’ legislative jurisdiction but treaty law 
does not generally govern the jurisdiction in the way that tax treaties do.65 Second, income 
tax treaties are bilaterally negotiated between each pair of countries. However, almost all the 
bilateral income tax treaties follow the pattern of the OECD model and define the limits of 
tax jurisdiction in a largely uniform manner.66  
 
DISTRIBUTIONAL CONSEQUENCES  
The primary objective of income tax treaties is to eliminate double taxation caused by 
overlapping jurisdictional claims by two countries based on source and residence. This 
objective is achieved by dividing tax jurisdiction between the two countries in treaties to 
establish exclusive rather than concurrent taxing rights. However, treaties allocate more 
taxing rights to residence countries than to source countries on a reciprocal basis. The OECD 
model gives the residence country the exclusive right to tax royalties, as well as business 
income unless the income is earned through a permanent establishment in the source country. 
In addition, residence countries are given the primary right to tax dividends and interest.  
 
A state can be a source country in one transaction and a residence country in another. If 
capital flows between two countries are more or less equal in both directions, the two 
 
63 Agreement between the European Union and the Kingdom of Norway on administrative cooperation, 
combating fraud and recovery of claims in the field of value added tax (2017).  
64 Commission, ‘An Action Plan for Fair and Simple Taxation Supporting the Recovery Strategy’ 
(Communication) COM (2020) 312 final.  
65 Ryngaert noted the ‘near total absence of useful treaty law in the field of jurisdiction’ in C Ryngaet, 
Jurisdiction in International Law (2nd edn, OUP 2015), 4.  
66 This point was made in 1964 when there were only five hundred income tax treaties. See, Mann, (n 17) 109.  
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countries have roughly equal chance to be source or residence countries. The allocation bias 
towards residence taxation does not have apparent distributional consequences. However, if 
capital flows are primarily one way, as is often the case between a developed country and a 
developing country, the developing, capital-importing, country is almost invariably the 
source country. The unequal distribution of tax jurisdiction in treaties may not be a problem 
in itself. It only becomes a problem if the distributional effects give rise to unfairness. There 
seems to be an assumption that a flow of benefits from poor countries to rich countries is 
unfair. The question of fairness in cooperation, however, largely depends on the fairness of 
arrangements without cooperation.  
 
There is nevertheless a lack of consensus on the fair division of tax jurisdiction over 
international income between countries, and developing countries and developed countries 
will inevitably have different views on fairness.67 The difficulty has no doubt been 
compounded by the fact that a state’s tax jurisdiction based on both source and residence is 
accepted as legitimate by other countries. If redistribution is not an objective of international 
tax system, the baseline for assessing fairness is that all countries have equal right to impose 
tax on the basis of source and residence.68 Evaluated against this baseline, tax treaties create 
an allocation bias that leads to unfair distribution of tax jurisdiction in favour of developed 
countries, more seriously restricting the ability of poorer countries to develop their national 
tax policy to raise the desired revenue.  
 
Indeed, the OECD acknowledged in its 1963 model the bias towards residence over source 
countries and suggested that for this reason the model should be used only as the basis for 
treaties between OECD nations, that is, developed economies.69 The caution had a short-lived 
impact as developed countries sought to expand their treaty networks to less developed 
economies receiving investment funds from residents in the developed nations and used the 
OECD model as the basis for negotiations. Concern by developing economies led the United 
Nations (UN), the successor of the League of Nations, to reengage with the model treaty 
process in 1967 and in 1979 the UN published a manual on negotiating tax treaties between 
developed and developing countries, followed in 1980 by an alternative model tax treaty with 
a more balanced division of taxing rights towards source countries.70 However, the UN had 
the OECD model as its starting point and the allocation principles, structure and language 
used in the UN model closely resemble those in the OECD model.71 The intervention of the 
UN with the alternative model mitigated, but did not remove, the bias towards residence 
countries which resulted from the basic structure of bilateral treaties that remove or limit the 
tax jurisdiction of source countries. Moreover, empirical studies suggest that the actual 
 
67 K Brooks, ‘Inter-Nation Equity: The Development of an Important but Underappreciated International Tax 
Policy Objective’ in JG Head and R Krever (eds), Tax Reform in the 21st Century (Kluwer Law International 
2009); and M. Devereux and others, Taxing Profits in a Global Economy (OUP 2021), 39.  
68 Whether redistribution should have a role to play in international tax arrangements is a question that has been 
asked but yet to be answered. See ‘The Role of Tax Treaties in the 21st Century’ Bulletin for International 
Taxation (2002).  
69 OECD, Draft Double Taxation Convention on Income and Capital (1963).   
70 UN, United Nations Model Double Taxation Convention between Developed and Developing Countries 
(1980).  
71 The differences between the OECD and UN Models are discussed in DR Whittaker, ‘An Examination of the 
O.E.C.D and U.N. Model Tax Treaties: History, Provisions and Application to U.S. Foreign Policy’ (1982) 8 
North Carolina Journal of International Law and Commercial Regulation 39.  
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inclusion of UN provisions in treaties signed by developing countries has not been very 
successful.72  
 
The unfair distribution of tax jurisdiction will likely result in an unfair distribution of tax 
revenue, creating ‘anomaly of aid in reverse – from poor to rich countries’.73 But this is not 
necessarily the case as the revenue gain or loss depends not only on the restrictions on taxing 
rights, but also on the changes of capital inflows and outflows as a result of the treaty, among 
other factors.74  
 
The necessity of tax treaties has increasingly been challenged on the ground of the 
distributional consequences.75 It is often argued that both unilateral and bilateral approaches 
resolve the jurisdictional overlaps by dividing the tax jurisdiction between source and 
residence countries and the main difference between the two approaches is distributional 
consequences, with the unilateral approach favouring source countries whereas the bilateral 
approach favouring residence countries.76 Concerns over the distributional consequences 
have prompted tax scholars and international organisations to advise developing countries to 
be cautious about entering into treaty negotiations with developed countries.77 In fact, most 
developed countries adopted the unilateral approach in their domestic laws that gives source 
countries the primary taxing rights. From a bargaining perspective, developing countries 
would lose taxing rights even if tax treaties divided tax jurisdiction equally between source 
and residence countries. The unfair distributional consequences make it more difficult to 
justify the desirability of income tax treaties, especially if the main objective of treaties can 
be achieved unilaterally.  
 
BILATERALISM OR MULTILATERALISM?  
The distributional consequences are a main factor that determines whether tax treaties are 
bilateral or multilateral. Multilateral agreements in other areas of law are not uncommon, in 
particular trade policy that is also a key area of a country’s economic interest.78 In the field of 
taxation, multilateral treaties are often developed in the issue areas concerning enforcement 
jurisdiction. An example is The Convention on Mutual Assistance in Tax Matters. However, 
income tax treaties are historically bilateral.  
 
The first multilateral income tax treaty was only concluded in 2017 as part of a global project 
initiated by the G20 and the OECD that aims to set up an international framework to address 
base erosion and profit shifting (BEPS) strategies by multinationals.79 The multilateral treaty 
is an important instrument to streamline the implementation of treaty-related BEPS measures. 
Its effect is simultaneous renegotiation of thousands of bilateral tax treaties while preserving 
 
72 W Wijnen and J de Goede, ‘The UN Model in Practice 1997-2013’ (2004) Bulletin for International Taxation 
118; V Daurer and R Krever, ‘Choosing between the UN and OECD Tax Policy Models: An African Case 
Study’ (2014) 22 African Journal of International and Comparative Law 1.  
73 CR Irish, ‘International Double Taxation Agreements and Income Taxation at Source’ (1974) 23 ICLQ 292.  
74 EM Zolt, ‘Tax Treaties and Developing Countries’ (2018) 72 Tax Law Review 111. Empirical studies show 
mixed results of the impact of tax treaties on foreign direct investment. For a summary of the empirical results, 
see T Dagan, International Tax Policy: Between Competition and Cooperation (CUP 2018), 107-110.   
75 See e.g., A. Easson, ‘Do We Still Need Tax Treaties?’ (2000) Tax Treaty Monitor 619.  
76 K Brooks and R Krever, ‘The Troubling Role of Tax Treaties’ in V Thurinyi and G Michielse (eds), Tax 
Design Issues Worldwide (Kluwer Law International 2015); Dagan, (n 74) 104.  
77 IMF, ‘Spillovers in International Corporate Taxation’ (2014).    
78 A notable example is The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade.  
79 Multilateral Convention to Implement Tax Treaty Related Measures to Prevent Base Erosion and Profit 
Shifting.  
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the bilateral nature of tax treaties. The success of the multilateral treaty has to be viewed with 
two caveats. First, the primary objective of the multilateral treaty is to address treaty-related 
tax avoidance and evasion. Unlike bilateral treaties, the multilateral treaty is not concerned 
with division of tax jurisdiction. Although some provisions in the multilateral treaty may 
slightly change the allocation of taxing rights between the two parties of a bilateral treaty, the 
change was resulted from the needs to address treaty abuse.80 Second, the multilateral treaty 
by its very nature operates on a bilateral basis. It modifies a bilateral treaty only to the extent 
that two parties of the bilateral treaty choose to apply a provision in the multilateral treaty.  
 
Bilateralism of tax treaties is a result of states jealously guarding their tax sovereignty.81 
Although income tax treaties perform functions in respect of both legislative and enforcement 
jurisdictions, treaty responses to enforcement issues, such as information exchange and 
assistance in the collection of tax debts, are relatively distributionally neutral and are 
therefore less contentious. In terms of legislative jurisdiction, however, the distributional bias 
in tax treaties can hardly win international consensus necessary for a multilateral treaty. 
Experience with bilateral income tax treaties and multilateral administrative cooperation 
treaties suggests it is the concern over distributional consequences resulting from an 
allocation of legislative jurisdiction that makes a multilateral income tax treaty unachievable.  
 
Another distinct feature of income tax treaties is that almost all the bilateral treaties follow 
the same principles of allocating tax jurisdiction enshrined in the OECD model. Although the 
initial purpose of the model was to serve as a manual that reduces transaction costs that 
would otherwise incur in bilateral negotiations, the model itself is a product of multilateral 
negotiation between OECD members. The model is well regarded as ‘a template for a 
multilateral web of treaties’, with its influence reaching far beyond the OECD countries.82  
 
Income tax treaties thus contain elements of both bilateralism and multilateralism.83 While 
the key allocation principles were multilaterally negotiated by the OECD members and 
followed in virtually all treaties, modifications based on these principles suited to specific 
political and economic circumstances between each pair of treaty partners were negotiated 
bilaterally. Bilateralism is a manifestation of the fact that legislative jurisdiction to tax is a 
crucial element of sovereignty and bilateral treaties are a better instrument to preserve tax 
sovereignty. Pure bilateral negotiations, however, would inevitably lead to high transaction 
costs. The multilateral negotiation of key distributive principles provides a means to 
minimise the transaction costs. Bilateralism combined with a common model is therefore a 
middle ground that achieves the benefits of cooperation while preserving a degree of 
flexibility for differentiated negotiations with different treaty partners.  
 
b) VAT Treaties  
Two important questions need to be considered for the adoption of VAT treaty are its 
distributional consequences and whether bilateral treaties or a multilateral treaty would be the 
preferred option. Since the proposed VAT treaty requires closer enforcement cooperation, in 
particular in respect of assistance in collection of taxes, than in the income tax treaties, it can 
be expected that the VAT treaty would not be distributionally neutral.  
 
80 P Baker, ‘BEPS and the Principles of International Taxation’ (Tax Advisor, 7 September 2016).  
81 Arnold, Sasseville and Zolt, (n 21), 94.  
82 JFA Jones, ‘The David R. Tillinghast Lecture: Are Tax Treaties Necessary?’ (1999) 53 Tax Law Review 1. 
83 T Rixen, ‘Bilateralism or Multilateralism? The Political Economy of Avoiding International Double Taxation’ 
European Journal of International Relations 16 (2010) 589.   
                                                             Author Accepted Manuscript, forthcoming in Legal Studies         
 21 
 
Similar to the distributional problems in bilateral income tax treaties, VAT treaties that assign 
rights and duties on a reciprocal basis would have unequal distributional consequences once 
trade flows and administrative capacities are taken into account. If outflows and inflows 
between two countries were roughly balanced, the two treaty partners would have similar 
incentives to collect the foreign tax. Any significant imbalance in flows between the two 
parties could lead to uneven distribution of obligations or administrative costs.84 Moreover, 
asymmetries in administrative capacities may have a more direct impact on revenue yields, 
with countries that have strong administrative capacity collecting a larger proportion of 
foreign VAT due. An important lesson of the income tax treaty experience is that where the 
distributional consequences of treaties are non-neutral, the international consensus needed for 
a multilateral treaty is more difficult to achieve. Therefore, a realistic starting point for 
international VAT cooperation would be the adoption of bilateral treaties.  
 
Although the proposed VAT treaty would also lead to distributional bias, the distributional 
consequences are nevertheless desirable. Contrary to the direction of flow of benefits in 
income tax treaties, VAT treaties between developed and developing countries may attribute 
larger benefits to developing countries. The continued growth of consumer demand for cross-
border business-to-consumer sales driven by rising incomes in the developing world creates 
new opportunities for e-commerce market players in developed countries. However, weaker 
administrative capacity in developing countries places constraints on their ability to capture 
cross-border sales. VAT treaties would enable developing countries to piggy-back off the 
administrative capacity of countries selling into their territories while increasing the 
competitiveness of their domestic exporters.  
 
The benefits that would accrue to developing countries should be seen as a counterbalance to 
the unfair distributional consequences of income tax treaties.85 The VAT treaty provisions 
could be incorporated into the existing income tax treaties to improve the overall fairness of 
tax treaties, although the VAT treaty may not completely offset the negative distributional 
consequences of the income tax treaty. Building VAT treaties into income tax treaties would 
also strengthen developing countries’ bargaining positions in negotiating VAT provisions, 
since they have already made greater compromises in the income tax treaties.  
 
The income tax treaty experience shows that efficient bilateral negotiations should be 
accompanied by a model treaty to reduce transaction costs. The OECD is well-placed to 
develop the VAT treaty model given its leading role in formulating international tax rules and 
expertise in developing the income tax treaty model. Equally importantly, the proposed 
model could complement the OECD’s current work on tax challenges arising from 
digitalisation.86  
 
The development of VAT treaties could form part of the wider coordinated actions in 
response to the COVID-19 crisis. The pandemic has exposed inequalities and divisions 
within and between countries and the pandemic itself is likely to further increase the existing 
 
84 The cost of collecting VAT in the UK, for example, was 0.7% of the revenue collected in 2010-11. See, 
HMRC, ‘Annual Report and Accounts 2010-11’ 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/89199/annual-
report-accounts-1011.pdf 
85 A similar view was expressed in terms of enforcement cooperation in income tax. See, Picciotto, (n 27) 305.  
86 See, e.g., (n 34); Tax Challenges Arising from Digitalisation – Report on Pillar One Blueprint & Report on 
Pillar Two Blueprint (OECD 2020).  
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disparities. Although almost all countries are severely affected by the pandemic, the 
economic impact of COVID-19 and the ability to respond to the crisis vary substantially 
across social groups and countries at different levels of development. Developing countries 
facing the challenges with weaker healthcare system, limited resources and less flexibility for 
fiscal and monetary policy are being hit the worst and recovery is expected to take longer in 
these economies. International organisations have emphasised the importance of providing 
special support to developing countries in light of the interconnectedness and 
interdependence of territorial states revealed by the pandemic.87 In addition to direct financial 
support, it is also imperative for the international community to support tax capacity building 
in developing countries to assist with their long-term recovery.88 Addressing the common 
challenges in VAT, the most important source of revenue for most middle and low income 
countries, should be a priority on the international tax agenda as the pandemic continues to 
unfold.89 The proposed VAT treaty could be a first step towards building a fairer and more 
sustainable international tax system.  
 
5. CONCLUSION  
Whilst the COVID-19 pandemic causes massive disruptions and presents unprecedented 
challenges on all fronts, it opens up a unique opportunity for the global community to address 
the existing tax challenges through international cooperation and move towards a more 
equitable international tax system for the benefits of all countries. The VAT treaties proposed 
in this article could be the start of this process.  
  
The challenges countries are facing in taxing cross-border transactions, in particular digital 
supplies and low value goods, under VAT become more prominent in light of the digital 
transmission accelerated by the pandemic. Treaties offer more effective solutions to over-
taxation and under-taxation that might occur as a result of legislative jurisdiction overlaps 
and territorial constraints on enforcement jurisdiction. Legislative jurisdiction overlap might 
arises when two countries have inconsistent domestic rules on the place of consumption, or 
when businesses incurring foreign expenses are denied refunds in the foreign country. 
Enforcement jurisdiction may be subject to territorial constraints, and consequently, cannot 
be exercised effectively in the case of digital supplies and low value goods imported by 
domestic consumers.  
 
The current income tax treaties provide a good model for a VAT treaty, although the 
underlying jurisdictional issues in income tax and VAT are different. The inconsistent 
domestic rules on the place of consumption can be addressed through a dispute resolution 
mechanism. The treaty would establish a refund system for input VAT incurred by businesses 
registered in the other country, with an information exchange procedure in place to reduce the 
risk of fraudulent refund claims. The VAT treaty would require closer cooperation over 
mutual assistance in the collection of taxes modelled on the one-stop-shop mechanism 
currently used in the EU to overcome the enforcement difficulty in terms of cross-border 
 
87 OECD, ‘Tax and Fiscal Policy in Response to the Coronavirus Crisis: Strengthening Confidence and 
Resilience’ (19 May 2020).  
88 V. Gaspar and others, ‘Facing the Crisis: The Role of Tax in Dealing with COVID-19’ (Flatform for 
Collaboration on Tax, 16 June 2020), available at https://www.tax-platform.org/news/blogs/facing-crisis-role-
tax-dealing-with-covid-19.  
89 The important role VAT will play for the COVID-19 recovery is highlighted by the European Commission in 
its recent initiative to reduce the VAT gap in the EU. See, ‘VAT- Mind the VAT Gap’ (European Commission), 
available at https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/better-regulation/have-your-say/initiatives/12816-Mind-the-VAT-Gap.   
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business-to-consumer sales of goods and digital supplies. These treaty measures would ease 
under-taxation and over-taxation in cross-border transactions, removing tax obstacles for 
businesses and increasing revenue yields for governments. The VAT treaty measures outlined 
in this article provide a basis for policymakers to commence their work in this area.  
 
The pandemic made the case for fostering international cooperation in areas where assistance 
to developing countries can be provided. Taxation is a key area for support because of its 
vital role in supporting economic mobilisation and financing recovery. However, the 
distributional consequences arising from the existing income tax treaties are normatively 
unappealing, with developed countries reaping more benefits from cooperation. In contrast, 
the proposed VAT treaties that favour developing countries would lead to normatively 
attractive distributional consequences. Accordingly, one further compelling reason for the 
adoption of VAT treaties, in addition to the solution to the jurisdictional problems, is 
precisely to secure the attractive distributional consequences such treaties would produce. 
These attractive distributional consequences would be worth pursuing in their own right, and 
a fortiori as a corrective to the unappealing distributional consequences that the income tax 
treaties generate.  
 
A revisit of the income tax experience reveals that where the distributional consequences are 
non-neutral, bilateral treaties are politically more attainable than a multilateral treaty. A 
model treaty is nevertheless needed to facilitate bilateral negotiations. Therefore, the 
proposed VAT treaty should follow the path of income tax treaties and take the form of 
bilateral treaties based on a common model. The potential political resistance from developed 
countries as a result of the distributional bias may be reduced by incorporating the VAT 
provisions into the existing income tax treaties. The need to raise revenue in all countries in 
the wake of the pandemic could provide new impetus for overcoming the political hurdles 
and reaching agreements internationally.  
 
